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Economics 2061: Dynamic Games and Contracts

Time and Place: Friday, 1 p.m. - 4 p.m., Littauer M-15

The Class Will Not Meet: 9/28

Class Format: The class will be a mix of lectures and student presentations

Class Requirements: The main class requirement will be a term paper. The paper will be a critical literature review of a particular topic, together with a proposal for a research project in that area. The secondary requirement will be a student presentation in class.

Reading List: Download the reading list. Only a subset of papers will be covered.

Preliminary Schedule:



Reading (see reading list for more sources)


Static mechanism design

Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green, Chp. 23


Static mechanism design, Common value auctions

Milgrom, P. and R. Weber, "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, 1982, 50, 1089-1122.


Repeated Games: Tools and Methods

Abreu, D., D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti, "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Econometrica v58, n5 (September 1990): 1041-63.

Fudenberg, D., D. Levine, and E. Maskin, "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Econometrica v62, n5 (September 1994): 997-1039.


Games with Transfers; Dynamic Games

David Miller, "Attainable Payoffs in Repeated Games with Interdependent Private Valuations"

Athey, S. and I. Segal, "An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism"


Relational Contracts and Trading Games

Levin, J., Relational Incentive Contracts

Athey, S. and D. Miller, Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuationsTheoretical Economics, 2 (2007), 299-354.



Athey, S. and K. Bagwell, "Optimal Collusion with Private Information." RAND Journal of Economics, Autumn 2001.

Athey, S., K. Bagwell, and C. Sanchirico, "Collusion and Price Rigidity." REStud, 2004.

Athey, S. and K. Bagwell, "Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks" forthcoming,Econometrica.


9/21: Static mechanism design.Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, Chapter 23.